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In  Social  Choice  Theory,  Pareto-Unanimity  is  an  important  rule  which  is  applied  to 
compensation tests and therefore in justice. But, deductive logics show that Pareto- Unanimity 
implies dictatorship and therefore, Pareto-Unanimity is contradictory with non dictatorship. In 
the  case  of  compensation,  citizens  are  free  and  accountable  for  their  own  behaviour;  the 
Pareto-unanimity implies perfect information on benefactors. Liberty implies dictatorship and 
then Pareto-Unanimity. compensation exigencies lead to a totalitarian society, as forwarded 
by the novel of George Orwell (1984). 
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“Always we shall have the heretic here at our mercy, screaming 
with  pain,  broken  up,  contemptible-and  in  the  utterly  penitent, 
saved from himself, crawling to our feet of his own accord.” (Lyrics 




There is some difficulty to associate Freedom and Justice. Indeed, in a paradox worthy of 
the “bar room philosophy
1”, liberalism implies unjust society and, conversely, a just society 
implies a totalitarian society. John Rawls [23] provides a brilliant solution to this apparent 
opposition by using a lexicographic principle in the constitution of society
2 and a leximin
3 in 
the process of redistribution. Does this paradox make sense? Justice, in its liberal economic 
version consists of repairing a given externality handicap by a social group, with its consent. 
Not  just  any  agreement,  this  compensation  requires  a  unanimous  social  choice  and  fully 
informed as possible without manipulation by the beneficiaries. 
Thus, in the context of the economic theory of justice, a perfectly free society
4 requires a 
social watching and the populist requirement of unanimity. "Discipline and Punish” [10] are 
practices  associated  with  liberal  society,  it  is  not  surprising  that  in  this  context,  the 
“Panopticon”
5 is associated by J. Bentham [3] to freedom: everyone in the circular prison can 
monitor and obtain information about others. This omniscience, used by totalitarian regimes, 
allows a justice at all levels and builds social responsibility, it is inherent in economic justice 
which task is to repair the externalities "freely". 
Inequalities  are  externalities,  such  as  unequal  talents  or  income  inequalities.  Thus, 
Rosenstein Rodan [26] considered poverty as a negative externality and Sen [29] focuses on 
inequality  of  capabilities.  This  basic  inequality  refers  to  sex,  race  and  all  kinds  of 
discriminations.  In  the  name  of  justice,  these  should  offset,  while  respecting  freedom  of 
                                                 
1 We called this paradox, the “café du commerce” paradox in F.M. Jarret and F.R. Mahieu [12]. 
2 The society must first be free, then fair and at least efficient. 
3 The redistribution, in the name of freedom must first help the poorest of the poor, then the less poor; the 
smallest sacrifice of the rich is the biggest benefit of the poor. This maximin is applied to a decreasing order to 
the poor, hence the term leximin. 
4 Freedom implies the absence of "arbitrary interference" according to the theory of neo-republicanism [21] 
5 Prison (as well as factory, hospital, school) is based on "surveillance without being seen”, hence the circular 
prisons or ear.   3 
choice and the rule of Pareto Unanimity
6 [1,2,28]. Sen [30] defends this approach on behalf of 
his theory of freedoms / capabilities. 
Externalities and compensation raise the question of social responsibility vis-à-vis this 
inequity by separating the unjust situation (not as the responsibility of the person, but rather 
the social responsibility), the situation just considered as the personal responsibility due to 
efforts or merits of the person. This proposition is especially sensitive, we must return to the 
intimacy of the person and  establish who will have this right,  additionally this interference  
determine  rewards  and  sanctions.  Finally,  there  must  be  agreement  on  transfers  that  will 
realise the compensation. 
Unanimity cannot be established spontaneously on such interference, given the selfishness 
of individuals, there is a need to  reduce discussion costs and  facilitate this unanimity by a 
central  power,  such  as  a  Ministry  of  Equal  Opportunity  Policy.  Social  compensation  is 
imposed in such a way. Knowing all the details of the lives of interested persons,  together 
with the imposition of a strong central structure characterize totalitarianism which may well 
be  adorned  in  democracy,  as  the  democratic  centralism  of  some  socialist  or  populist 
democracy.  Our  arguments  are  inspired  from  the  writings  of  George  Orwell,  especially 
"1984". This paradox of democratic totalitarianism appears already in the formalization of 
logical theorems of social choice. 
In this paper we present a way to conceive a just compensation to externalities which 
requires delimiting social responsibility. A just situation necessitates complete information on 
beneficiaries  in  order  to  evaluate  handicaps  and  merits  for  avoiding  free  riders.  Such  an 
approach limits social responsibility. A just state requires Pareto- Unanimity condition, a state 
in which everyone agrees on the compensation. Thus, no one is constrained by the majority 
decision  which  is  a  proof  of  freeness.  Therefore,  compensation  raises  two  issues:  the 
interference on individual privacy and a dictatorship situation as a pre-condition of Pareto-
Unanimity and a corruption of liberty as formalised in the social choice theory. Dictatorship 
and social watching are associated to develop totalitarianism in a liberal society. 
Thus,  our  paper  is  organised  as  follows,  in  the  first  section,  Minimal  liberalism,  as 
formalised  by  Sen  [28],  is  closed  to  dictatorship,  a  free  redistribution  applying  Pareto-
unanimity and then, perfect information on personal characteristics in a totalitarian society. In 
                                                 
6 We distinguish an optimal situation (cf. Pareto) of the Pareto-Unanimity (derived from the first). An optimal 
situation is defined either in terms of differential analysis (marginal) in the terms of the axiomatic analysis. It is, 
for a given group of agents, a state of rest in the replacement of utilities (hence equal TMS / TTP), is still a 
favorite at any other. The Pareto Unanimity is a condition on the aggregation of choice .... and that is paradoxical 
(cf. the criticisms of the Public Choice and the paradoxes of social choice [28].   4 
the second section we show that dictatorship involves Pareto-unanimity particularly in terms 
of social compensation which cannot be reached without social responsibility. In section 3, we 
conclude on this paradox. 
 
1. Minimal Liberty and Liberty as dictatorship 
1.1. Minimal liberalism 
Since the theorem of impossibility of Arrow suggesting the warn of a dictatorial state; 
several studies have attempted to verify the possibility of the existence of a rational individual 
preference  binding  on  all  individual  preferences  (see  for  instance,  [16,18].  In  the  same 
framework  Mongin  [17]  shows  that  dictatorship  arises  in  IIA  Arrovian  condition.  In  our 
analysis we present the existence of dictatorship in a different manner. Dictatorship implies 
Pareto-Unanimity which, according to Sen [28], is incompatible with a minimal liberalism. 
Specifically, the case of populism
7 (all for one, one for all) illustrates well the ambiguity of 
unanimity  and  that  dictatorship  implies  unanimity  and  not  the  contrary.  Thus,  Pareto-
unanimity  is  accomplished  against  freedom  and  characterizes  a  totalitarian  society  with  a 
leader who, once in power, decreed unanimously and monitors the deviants. Two examples 
are  used  in  the  economic  literature,  the  social  compensation  of  unequal  talent  by  public 
transfers [24,25,9] and social compensation in income inequalities in private transfers [6,8].  
These are based on the sequence freedom-social constrains, according to the framework of 
thought of Sen [30]. Free individuals agree to enter into a social process for a better justice, 
even to bear with the control of an Orwellian institution. 
This  sequence  involves  serious  risks  of  a  totalitarian  coercion.  Indeed,  we  need 
information, to watch, punish or reward, prior to offset. Let us call this procedure of total 
watching, T, which falls into the sequence: 
 
Perfect freedom ￿ Total Watching (T) ￿ Dictatorship (D) ￿ Pareto Unanimity-(Pu) ￿ 
social Compensation (C) 
 
The above sequence can be interpreted as follows: in case of participating in social actions for 
instance in compensating inequalities individuals must be totally free and it requires complete 
information on beneficiaries which can only be obtained through total supervision or total 
watching. 
                                                 
7 See populist democracy according to Dahl [7].   5 
Thus,  freedom  involves  close  supervision  and  this  sequence  illustrates  the  bad 
consequences of liberalism associated with social responsibility, in Amartya Sen’s design. 
This  sequence  reverses  the  Kantian  framework  for  which  the  constraint  related  to 
responsibility is the condition of freedom of the persons: the responsibility as auto-constraint 
is the prelude to freedom. We formulate this sequence in the following section. 
 
1.2. Freedom implies dictatorship 
The proximity of the formalization of freedom with that of the dictatorship appears in the 
framework of Arrow [1,2] and Sen [28], due to the absence of a specific formalization of 
normative  statements.  This  formulation  ( ) Pcxy Pixy i y x É $ " , ,   means  dictatorship  in  the 
definition of Arrow with confusion between implication and determination. But Sen formulate 
minimal liberty in postulating that there exists at least one individual who finds (in the sense 
of  implying)  that  individual  preference  in  social  preference.  We  assume  that  a  social 
preference can be established without being directly implied by one’s individual preference. 
This collective rationality  is discussed by Arrow [2] in the last lines of his book against 
Buchanan and Tullock [4] and nominalism: a collective preference may differ from individual 
preferences; it is not a simple summation. In the framework of Sen [28], the liberal is deeply  
concerned that his personal freedom is preserved from the interferences with others. Two 
norms  of  liberalism  can  be  distinguished:  let  us  note  L:  Each  person  has  at  least  one 
alternative which is decisive in the social choice. L * (minimum liberalism): there are at least 
two persons, couple of alternatives (x,y) on which they are decisive. 
In all these cases, and in the condition D * of Sen [28:53], the situation is defined from an 
existential quantification on a pair of social states (x, y): there are a couple of social states 
such as in this couple, individual choice implies social choice. 
Let us write:     ( ) Pcxy Pixy y x i É $ "    ,                   (1) 
In fact,  Pcxy Pixy É  applies to any couple of x, y for which Pixy  .    ¬ Pcxy is false.  
     Pcxy Pixy Ú Ø  corresponds to the truth of the implication. This expression holds therefore 
for any object x which is not Pi or which is Pc. 
Therefore, our formula means that there are at least a couple (x,y) as it is not Pi or is Pc. 
Also this term is trivial except if Pi is true for any couple of (x,y) of the universe, and Pc is 
true for each. Quine (1972) evokes in this subject to a "fault of beginner" which is to be 
"discouraged once and for all." Therefore, it is possible to write: 
                     ( ) Pcxy Pixy y x i · $ "    ,                     (2)   6 
Thus freedom of redistribution (the liberality) implies that every citizen "gives" the maximum 
of information with total watching. Curiously, the minimal liberty in the framework of the 
formal logic of social choice (Arrow, 1951, 1963, Sen 1970) is equivalent to dictatorship. 
 
2.  Dictatorship  implies  Pareto-Unanimity,  necessary  for  a  liberal  economic  justice, 
particularly to social responsibility 
This implication is normal: once the power obtained, by force if necessary, the dictator 
imposes unanimity. This unanimity plays an important role in compensating externalities in 
economics. Indeed, it is derived from the principle of “ophelimity” of Pareto and permits to 
save  on  the  conditions  of  choice.  A  majority  choice  automatically  creates  many 
supplementary conditions that make social choice inconsistent. 
 
2.1. The logical implication 
The principle of utilitarianism in Social Theory of Arrow [1,2] receives the following 
definition: 
( ) Rcxy Rixy i y x É " "       ,       (3) 
Or, considering only the preference (and therefore a strict partial order): 
( ) Pcxy Pixy i y x É " "       ,       (4) 
From this expression, we deduce: 
( ) Pcxy Pixy y x i É " "    ,          (5) 
(5)  Is  the  same  formula  as  (1)  representing  the  dictatorship  (which  gives  reason  to  the 
criticism  of  Rawls:  utilitarianism  as  follows  contains  the  seeds  of  dictatorship).  
     Permutation of quantifiers (it is reasonable to infer a universal existential with universal 
existentialised but not the reverse), we deduce the following formula: 
( ) Pcxy Pixy i y x É " "       ,       (6) 
This formula is equivalent to 
[ ] Pcxy Pixy i y x É " " :     ,       (7) 
 (7) Is the criterion of Pareto-Unanimity! 
The demonstration of this equivalence, quite classical in the logic of quantification, "in spite 
of its strangeness" (cf. Quine, 1972) is as follows: for any couple (x,y)  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) Pcxy Pixy i
Pcxy Pixy i Pcxy Pixy i
Pcxy Pixy i Pcxy Pixy i
É " º
Ú Ø" º Ú Ø $ º
Ú Ø $ º É $
:
: :    (8)   7 
We demonstrate that social utilitarianism (U.S.) implies dictatorship (D) which in turn 
implies unanimity (Pu). Consider the last implication;  Pu D É is equivalent according to the 
condition of validity of the implication of the material in Pu D Ú Ø . This disjunction, given the 
formulas  used,  must  be  considered  as  exclusive.  The  norms  retained  by  Arrow  cannot 
associate unanimity to the non dictatorship on the risk of being inconsistency. We note that 
the implication  Pu D É is not reversible. Unanimity may create a situation of veto (blocking 
the unanimous decision because of the abstention or refusal of a person), but does not imply 
dictatorship. 
 
2.2. The possibility of compensation and Pareto-Unanimity 
Social  responsibility  includes  perfect  information  and  possibility  of  compensation. 
Compensations  intend  to  repair  externalities  resulting  from  changing  a  situation  y  to  a 
situation x. The choice of state x above the state y by everybody, results from compensations, 
even not actually paid. In fact it is a problem of social choice. 
The tests of compensation are only the extensions of the principle of Paretian unanimity. 
[ ] Pcxy Pixy i y x É " " : ,         (9) 
Let us call  ( ) x S  the set of all social states that can be achieved by the redistribution from the 
state x (the latter belonging itself to ( ) x S ). 
( ) x S xÎ             (10) 
According to Kaldor [13], x is superior to y if it permits to achieve a state z asPczyin 
accordance with the Pareto criterion such as if there is a change from y to x, the winners can 
compensate  losers  while  maintaining  their  gains.  So,  if  there  is  Pcxy   then  Pcyx   is  not, 
contrariwise, the reactionary test of Hicks [11] requires that if not  Pcyx  keeping their gains, 
thenPcxy  is. Arrow [2] devotes long passages to this principle, or "test". As part of a function 
of collective choice such as R and P, we consider the relationship Cxy signifying that x can 
be deduced from y with compensatory payments. We introduce the relation Q, a pre-order to 
unanimity. 
Let us assume the relationship 
Qixy def Rixy i   : º "           (11) 
Let this pre-order (with reflexivity and transitivity) which means according to Sen that: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] Pizy i Rizy i x S z z Pcxy X y x : : : : , $ · " · Î $ º Î "  
                (12)   8 
The fact that x is socially preferred to y is equivalent to the fact that if z belongs to Z, 
there is a Pareto unanimity forRizyand at least one person has this preference. According to 
Arrow (1963), the principle of Kaldor can be written: 
[ ] ( ) ' ' ' ' : , Qyx y Qx x Cx x Pcxy X y x Ø · · $ º Î "   (13) 
According  to  Scitovsky  [27],  the  test  of  Kaldor  is  contradictory  with  any  function  of 
collective  preference  for  any  configuration  of  preference.  Let  us  write  with  Sen  [28]  the 
choice of the functors as Pareto inclusive:  ( ) Rixy i xy Ru :   " º and as well, Pu and Iu. These 
Pareto-inclusive choices imply social choice: and thus, ifPuxy, thenPcxy ; and similarly, if 
xy Iu   thenIcxy. Thus, there exists z such as  ( ) [ ] zy Pu x S   :  according to the Pareto criterion 
and there exists w such as  ( ) [ ] wx Pu y S   :  according to the same Pareto criterion [28]. 
We  note  that  compensation  occurs  in  the  context  of  social  choice  theory
8,  sub-Pareto 
Unanimity,  that is with the risks of the dictatorship, given the proximity between the formal 
Dictatorship (D) and the Pareto-Unanimity (Pu). This logical risk becomes effective in the 
case of social offsetting of inequalities of talent and income. 
Pareto-Unanimity  is  also  required  on  the  existence  whether  or  not  of  a  social 
responsibility. If a group member is forced to accept redistribution, the solution is not viable. 
Unanimity is not consensus but the consequences of the two previous conditions. Thus, we 
need a Panopticon and a “Ministry of Love” which characterises a totalitarian society; this 
society is dictatorial and requires unanimity. Social responsibility, coupled with a consensus 
is invoked by Sen [30] and many authors, but it is not immune to the dilemma that has been 
exposed. This shows that in terms of positive ethics the responsibility is not good in itself and 
depends on the context. The theory of social responsibility is not morally tenable because 
dictatorship raises the issue of interference. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Many institutions are "in reverse" of their mission, a ministry of peace manages the war, a 
Ministry of freedom is responsible for monitoring the people, a ministry of integration to 
expel immigrants, a ministry of Women's Affairs to better “assist” women. Orwell [20] had 
imagined and the Ministries of Love, of Truth, Peace, Abundance
9. The policy of individual 
freedom may well conceal the worst watching society. What are the first inequalities? The 
                                                 
8 Ronald Coase [5] prefers the compensation through the market and criticizes the economy of well-being which 
will proceed necessarily by laws to charge taxes as compensatory. 
9 Their names [20], in Newspeak, were Miniver, Minipax, Miniamour, Miniplein.   9 
liberal  policy  of  compensation  may  apply  in  addition  to  the  cases  mentioned  above,  to 
women, immigrants, and animals. But isn’t it an ambiguity to consider women for instance as 
an  exploited  class  or  inferior  at  the  beginning  point  to  seek  for  Pareto  unanimity 
compensation?
10 In summary, the compensation is an extension of the Pareto-Unanimity and 
may  cause  a  situation  of  social  constraint.  Indeed,  for  the  reasons  of  information,  it  is 
necessary to know the best "type" of each beneficiary in order to detach the disability from 
the merit. This implies a social watching to ascertain the exact handicaps of each person and a 
central planning for compensation. Freedom involves making social watching of the Ministry 
of  Equal  Opportunity  Policy,  a  planner,  a  "Big  Brother"  or  a  soviet.  Wittgenstein  [1961] 
argues that the reality is the shadow of the grammar. In the case of this paradox, the theory 
shows that freedom involves social watching and dictatorship. And finally, the dictatorship 
implies  Pareto  unanimity.  Historically,  liberal  individualism  has  produced  in  many 
circumstances, complete control, a dictatorship
11, which later will require unanimity. We must 
be able to appreciate "the democracy of others" [31] as if it can reveal dictatorial forms, 
particularly during major crises. 
 
                                                 
10 We see all the ambiguity of the liberal feminism with Nussbaum [19]. 
11 Thus, the Weimar Nazi Republic produced according to this method, so the Italy mussolinian. These schemes 




The logical formalization is Polish notation, also known as “prefix notation”, invented by Jan 
Lukasiewicz around 1920; it is inspired in our case by Georges Kalinowski [15] works. Its 
distinguishing features are: 
-  That it places operators to the left of their operands The linked variables are nominal 
(i,j)  and  actions  alternatives  (x,y,z).  The  place  of  the  nominal  variables  is  a 
fundamental choice, about the person status, contested by Von Wright about norms 
-  These variables must be fixed for an operator such that P for preference. So, if Pi xy is 
used, for an individual preference, we must use a variable c to express social choice and then 
P c x,y i. .So in all the cases, P is a three side predicate and cannot be, simultaneously, a two 
and three sides operators. 
-  Specific predicates must be used to formalise norms, to avoid the current error which 
uses alethic forms (there is or not a dictator), this signifies than norms are  automatically 
verified…. 
-   The rules are the standard rules of logics, especially about Well Written Formulas 
(wwf). In the case of Sen [28], to use an existential quantifier on an implication to formalize 
freedom is incorrect. 
 
The main logical ingredients of the economic theory of social choice 
The starting point of this theory is to formalize on one hand the relationship of existing 
choice between individuals or the social, and on the other hand the alternative social states. 




Necessary for the formation of well formed formula, these are variables of functors (or 
predicates), connectors, quantifiers and brackets, parentheses and points. 
 
The variables 
- The nominal variables x, y, z represent alternative social states.  
- The nominal individual variable i refers to individuals, and c refers to the community. 
- The universes selected by these variables are defined by a semantic set:   11 
- The different social states (x, y, z) belong to a matrix of choices, represented by a set X 
which we can be isolated into sub-sets such that S; 
-Different individuals i  belonging to the finite  set of individuals in the society, or  H, 
broken down into sub-groups such as G. 
 
Functors relating to processes of choice 
 The relationship of  choice on a  couple of  alternative social state is expressed by the 
functor R. The strict preference and indifference are expressed by the functors P and I. 
Each of these functors respectively implies a logical order (eg R for a complete order, P 
for  strict  order  and  I  as  a  preorder)  to  meet  specific  properties  data,  in  particular  the 
transitivity. 
 
The main connectors of the classical logic 
- Negation, ¬, as a propositional functor to a propositional argument. 
- Negation, ¬, as a nominal functor to a nominal argument. 
 -The  conjunction,  ·,  the  disjunction,  Ú,  the  implication,  É the  double  implication  or 
biconditionnal,  º,  these  four  connectors  being  propositional  functors  to  two  propositional 
arguments. The implication will be noted É rather than⇒, because it is only a conditional 
coupling (If. .. then) of two facts without relation of causal effects or determination; the latter 
interpretation being unfortunately suggested by the use of the sign-->. 
 
Quantifiers  
The existential quantifier: $ 
The universal quantifier: " 
Brackets [], parentheses () and points: to clarify the scope of quantifiers. 
 
   12 
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